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THREE ESSAYS ON FDI IN CHINA 
Mingming Pan, Ph.D. 
University of Nebraska, 2011 
Adviser: Hendrik Van den Berg 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has contributed a great deal to China’s 
extraordinary growth by injecting capital into the economy, creating jobs, transferring 
technology and knowledge, enhancing trade, bringing in competition for local enterprises, 
improving the quality of local labor and intermediate goods suppliers, and connecting 
China’s gradually opening economy to the global market. For over a decade, China has 
been the second largest recipient of inward FDI in the world behind the United States. In 
2009, China received $95 billion, which is 8.5% of the world’s total. However, the large 
amount of inward FDI has been unevenly distributed across Chinese provinces, with 
around 80% annual inward FDI flowing into the coastal region of China. Central 
authorities of China have been making efforts in directing FDI from the eastern coast to 
farther inland. 
This dissertation analyzes the regional determinants of FDI inflows into Chinese 
provinces and intends to fill certain gaps in the literature and provide new directions in 
this strand of research.  
 
 
 
After the introductory chapter that provides a general overview of FDI inflows in 
China, three self-contained essays follow. The first essay analyzes the changing 
agglomeration effect of FDI in China. Empirical evidence supports a weakening 
agglomeration effect of FDI over the years, and it suggests that at present FDI is not 
agglomerating. In addition, this research empirically points out the changing relative 
importance in market size as an FDI determinant over the years.  
The aims of the second essay are to examine the interdependence of Chinese 
provinces and to provide empirical evidence for the recent general equilibrium theory of 
multinational enterprises. Using two spatial models, I find that despite the competing 
pattern of FDI across provinces, not all surrounding provinces’ endowments display 
competing effects. Actually some surrounding provinces’ endowments have 
complementary effects. Evidence suggests that Export-Platform and Pure-Vertical forms 
of FDI dominate the aggregate FDI inflows into China.  
As some past studies have shown concerns regarding the feedback of FDI on 
GDP and the wage rate, the third essay constructs a simultaneous equations model to 
further explore this issue. Above all, the empirical results relieve our worry about the 
simultaneity problem, since FDI has delayed effects on both GDP and the wage rate.
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Chapter One: Brief Introduction on FDI in China 
 
1. Timeline of China’s opening process1 
 
Since the late 1970s, China has gradually opened up its economy to the outside 
world. The opening-up process during the past three decades can be classified into six 
stages: (1) establishment of the pilot special economic zones; (2) further opening up of 
coastal cities; (3) further expansion of the already opened coastal regions; (4) the 
development and opening up of Pudong New Area in Shanghai; (5) opening up 
nationwide; (6) accession to the WTO. 
The first stage was the establishment of the pilot Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs2). In July 1979 and May 1980 the Party Central Committee and State Council 
decided to establish Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in 
Fujian Province as SEZs. They formed the experimental base for China’s opening policy. 
SEZs have made good use of the special favorable policies provided by the central 
government and their geographical, lingual, and cultural advantage of being close to 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. SEZs have actively participated in international 
competition and cooperation, and developed export-oriented economies. SEZs were also 
the first to open financial and other service industries to foreign investment, and they are 
still the most concentrated areas of foreign investment.  
                                                 
1 Mostly based on Jian Chang’s article ‘The historical process of China’s opening up’. 
2 Special Economic Zones are usually abbreviated as SEZs. 
3 Please refer to Marshall (1920), Krugman (1991), Fujita et al. (1999) for more on agglomeration 
economies. 2 Special Economic Zones are usually abbreviated as SEZs. 
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The second stage was the further opening up of coastal cities to FDI and trade. In 
May 1984, the Party Central Committee and State Council, after reviewing the 
experience of the SEZs, decided to further liberalize the following 14 coastal port cities 
of Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, 
Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Beihai City. Compared to the 
average level of development of China at that time, each of these 14 cities had a 
relatively solid industrial foundation with industrial workers, technical talents, advanced 
science and education, as well as a history of contact with the outside world. Opening up 
these cities, along with the establishment of economic and technological development 
zones, has developed the entire coastal region.  
The third stage was the further expansion of the already opened coastal regions. In 
February 1985, the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, Xiamen-Zhangzhou-
Quanzhou Triangle in south Fujian and the Bohai regions were opened for the coastal 
economic open zones.  These areas, which include a total of 41 cities and 218 counties, 
formed a coastal belt with a population of more than 200 million. 
The fourth stage was the development and opening up of the Pudong New Area in 
Shanghai. On June 2, 1990, the Party Central Committee and the State Council decided to 
further liberalize and develop the Pudong New Area. Pudong was given the special 
preferential policies similar to those of SEZs. The Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone, 
Jinqiao Export Processing Zone, Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, and Zhangjiang Hi-Tech 
Park were established in the Pudong New Area.  
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The fifth stage was the nationwide opening to trade and investment. In 1992, 13 
border cities, six cities along the Yangtze River, and 18 inland provincial capital cities 
were opened up. 32 state-level economic and technological development zones, 52 high-
tech development zones, 13 free trade zones, and 34 ports were approved. 
The sixth stage was the accession to the WTO. Hence, opening to the outside 
world entered a new phase. In November 2001, in the Qatari capital of Doha, the 4th 
Ministerial Conference approved China’s accession to the WTO. Since 2001, China’s 
opening has moved from limited market opening into a full market opening, from the old 
pilot-based policy-oriented opening into a broad opening under a formal legal framework. 
 
2. FDI in China 
 
Since the opening of China to international trade and investment in the late 1970s, 
foreign direct investment in China increased gradually during the 1980s and experienced 
a surge since early 1990s. Figure 1 shows the growth. By 1993, China had become the 
largest recipient of FDI in the developing world and, second only next to the United 
States globally. From 1979 to 2008, the cumulative amount of FDI flowing into China 
had reached US$852.6 billion. The source, mode of entry, and type of FDI in China has 
been changing over the years.  
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Figure 1 FDI inflows into China 1985-2008 (in $100 million) 
 
2.1. FDI Distribution by Provinces 
Figure 2 FDI inflows by Region (%) 
 
We can see from Figure 2 that the FDI inflows has been unevenly distributed, 
with Eastern China receiving more than 80% of total FDI inflows throughout the years. 
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Central China steadily attracted an increasing share during the 1990s and has achieved 
even faster growth after 2000. In contrast, since 1993, Western China had received a 
declining share of FDI until the past few years.  
 
Figure 3  FDI inflows by Province in Southeastern China 
 
 
Figure 3 plots the FDI inflows into each province of Southeastern China from 
1979 to 2005. Southeastern China has been receiving more than half of all FDI into 
China. From 1979 to the early 1980s, Guangdong and Fujian were the first two provinces 
opened up. Most FDI flowing into China was from Hong Kong. Nearly all FDI went to 
Guangdong Province due to its geographical proximity to Hong Kong. When the coastal 
cities were opened, Shanghai (one of the self-administered municipalities) quickly 
became one of the top receivers of FDI. In the 1980s, Jiangsu gradually improved its 
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attractiveness to FDI in the 1980s, and stood out at the beginning of the 1990s. Since then 
Jiangsu steadily climbed up the ranking of FDI receivers, and now has even surpassed 
Guangdong as the largest recipient of FDI in China. In contrast, Hainan as a fifth special 
economic zone, only achieved noticeable improvement in the 1990s, and then vanished 
from the top 10 receiver list.  
 
Figure 4 FDI inflows by Province in Northeastern China 
 
 
Figure 4 plots the FDI inflows into each province of Northeastern China from 
1979 to 2005. Northeastern China comes in second to Southeastern China in receiving 
FDI. In the 1980s, Tianjin (one of the self-administered municipalities) received most of 
the FDI to this region. Between 1986 and 1989, FDI into Beijing (capital of China, 80 
miles away from Tianjin) surged and took over Tianjin’s place. Beijing drew away much 
of FDI from its nearby municipality (Tianjin). Liaoning rose after Tianjin in early 1980s, 
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and steadily improved its attractiveness to FDI. Shandong rose later than most other 
provinces in this region, but grew very fast and has now become the top receiver of FDI 
in this region. Hebei has constantly remained at the bottom in this region. 
 
Figure 5  FDI inflows by Province in Central China 
 
Figure 5 depicts FDI inflows into the provinces of Central China. In the 1980s, 
Central China received the least amount of FDI. But since the mid-1990s, this region has 
steadily attracted a larger share, and especially during recent years, has grown very fast, 
leaving Western China far behind. Heilongjiang performed well in the early 1980s and 
was overtaken by the southern provinces of Hunan and Hubei. Overall Southern 
provinces have attracted more FDI than Northern provinces. 
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Figure 6  FDI inflows by Province in Western China 
 
 
Figure 6 depicts FDI inflows into the provinces of Western China. FDI inflows 
into this region is dominated by the top three performers (Guangxi, Shaanxi, and 
Sichuan) that account for more than 95% of the total inflow. Some studies have classified 
Guangxi as an Eastern Coastal province, because a small part of this province is on the 
coastline and one of the 14 open coastal cities in 1984 is located in this province. But this 
study places Guangxi into Western China, as its geographical location and endowments 
are more similar to Western China’s provinces. Not surprisingly, around 1984, Guangxi 
performed best in this region. But very quickly, its leadership position was taken over by 
Shaanxi (a northwestern province) during 1985-1990. During the 1990s, Guangxi rose 
again to the top place in this region, but it has fallen back since the late 1990s. Sichuan 
has steadily improved its attractiveness to FDI and remained the largest recipient of FDI 
in the West since 2000.  
 
0.00 
2.00 
4.00 
6.00 
8.00 
10.00 
12.00 
14.00 
16.00 
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Sichuan
Guangxi
Qinghai
Shaanxi
Yunnan
Gansu
Guizhou
Xinjiang
Ningxia
9 
 
2.2. FDI inflows by Industries 
Table 1 FDI inflows (contracted value) by Sector in 1995 
Sector # of 
Projects 
Value 
(USD) 
   
Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery and Water 
Conservancy  
903 173,578 
Industry  27,687 6,164,763 
Construction  944 191,836 
Transportation, Postal and Telecommunications Services  268 169,698 
Commerce, Food Services, Material Supply and Marketing  1,851 342,665 
Real Estate, Public Residential and Consultancy Services  3,279 1,783,542 
Tourist Hotel  171 95,377 
Health Care, Sports and Social Welfare  174 83,741 
Education, Culture and Arts  162 34,496 
Scientific Research and Polytechnical Services  275 27,775 
Others  1,468 156,059 
   
National Total  37,011 9,128,153 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1996 issue 
Over the years, China has increasingly opened up more industries to FDI, and the 
regulations on prohibited, restricted, and encouraged industries were amended four times 
(in 1992, 1997, 2004, and 2007). Accordingly, along with China’s domestic economic 
development, the amount and share of FDI received by each industry has changed over 
time. Table 1 and Table 2 provide a sharp contrast.   
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Table 2 Foreign Direct Investment (actual value) by Sector in 2008 
Sector Number of Value 
Projects  
(unit) (USD 
10,000) 
 Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery 917 119,102 
 Mining 149 57,283 
 Manufacturing 11,568 4,989,483 
 Production and Supply of Electricity, Gas and Water 320 169,602 
 Construction 262 109,256 
 Transport, Storage and Post 523 285,131 
 Information Transmission, Computer Services and Software 1,286 277,479 
 Wholesale and Retail Trades 5,854 443,297 
 Hotels and Catering Services 633 93,851 
 Financial Intermediation 25 57,255 
 Real Estate 452 1,858,995 
 Leasing and Business Services 3,138 505,884 
 Scientific Research, Technical Service and   
   Geologic Prospecting 1,839 150,555 
 Management of Water Conservancy, Environment and   
   Public Facilities 138 34,027 
 Services to Households and Other Services 205 56,992 
 Education 24 3,641 
 Health, Social Security and Social Welfare 10 1,887 
 Culture, Sports and Entertainment 170 25,818 
 Public Management and Social Organizations 1   
 International Organizations   6 
 Total 27,514 9,239,544 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 2009 issue 
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Figure 7  FDI inflows by Three Basic Sectors 
 
 
Figure 7 categorizes the industries into three basic sectors, primary, secondary, 
and tertiary sectors and plots the change in share of FDI inflows received by each sector 
over time. Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery services are classified into 
the primary sector. The secondary sector includes construction, mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, production and supply of water, electricity and gas. The tertiary sector 
includes transportation, storage and post, wholesale and retail, hotel and catering 
services, financial, real estate, and other services. The primary sector has been receiving a 
very small share of total FDI, just 1 to 2 percent. The secondary sector has had the 
predominant share, with manufacturing predominant. China’s gradual opening policy 
initially only allowed export-oriented FDI except for off-shore oil exploration and the 
real estate sector. Not until 1992 did China open its domestic market. The regulations on 
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prohibited, restricted, and encouraged industries were amended four times. By the end of 
2006, there remained very few restrictions. The tertiary sector share was starting to rise in 
2006. With recent years’ relaxation of restrictions on the financial sector and other 
industries in the tertiary sector, this sector’s share is expected to rise even more.  
 
2.3. FDI inflows by Source Economies 
 
Before the mid-1990s, FDI from Hong Kong accounted for a predominant share 
(over 50%) of total FDI inflows in China. Since 1993 its share has been declining, and 
had dropped to around 32% by the end of 2006. Tuan and Ng. (2003) explain the 
dominance of FDI from Hong Kong when China was first opened up. First, in the late 
1970s, Hong Kong was suffering domestically from increasingly high labor costs and 
was losing its competitiveness in the world market. China’s opening up with its export-
promotion policy, large cheap labor pool, and cheap land use pulled in FDI from Hong 
Kong, mostly in labor-intensive manufacturing. Second, in 1978, China first opened up 
two provinces: Guangdong and Fujian. Guangdong is bordered with Hong Kong, shares 
the same language and culture, and is home to many people from Hong Kong. For similar 
reasons, other newly industrialized countries in Asia have had significant shares of FDI 
inflows to China as well, such as Taiwan and Singapore. Like the FDI from Hong Kong, 
these other inflows of FDI were for export-oriented and labor-intensive industries.  
Since 1992, when China opened its domestic market, FDI from developed 
countries has increased faster than FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan. FDI from 
developed countries is more technology and capital intensive, and it more often targets 
13 
 
the domestic Chinese market. For this type of FDI, labor cost is still a consideration, but 
China’s potential domestic market, the quality of its labor force, and its infrastructure are 
more important determinants. 
 
2.4. FDI inflows by Entry Mode 
Figure 8 FDI inflows by Entry Model 
 
Equity Joint Enterprises are joint investments by a Chinese party and a foreign 
party, with financial information calculated in the same currency. The two parties share 
in the distribution of investment profits, risks and carry out the liquidation according to 
the ratio of investment amount.  
Contractual Joint Enterprises are joint investments by a Chinese party and a 
foreign party. The two parties share distribution of investment profits, risks, and carry out 
liquidation based on contractual agreement instead of the ratio of investment amount. 
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Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises are entirely foreign-owned investment, in 
which foreigners obtain investment profits, take all risks, operate the business, and carry 
out liquidation.  
Joint exploration is the abbreviation of maritime and overland oil joint 
exploration. It is a widely adopted measure of economic cooperation in the international 
natural resources field. The striking features are high risk, high investment and high 
reward. The joint development is often divided into three steps: exploitation, 
development, and production. Compared with the other three means mentioned above, 
joint cooperation accounts for a small ratio of all Chinese FDI inflows. 
Contractual joint ventures were the predominant form of FDI into China in the 
early 1980s. Starting the late 1980s, however, the share of contractual joint ventures has 
been declining, with equity joint ventures replacing contractual ones. Wholly-owned 
foreign enterprises are beginning to appear and take an ever-increasing share. Since the 
late 1990s, wholly-owned enterprises have become the predominant form of FDI. By the 
end of 2006, the share of wholly-owned foreign enterprises had reached 73.4%.  
Note: From the above-mentioned pattern of FDI distribution across regions, 
sectors, source economies, and entry mode, we can tell that it would be best to use 
disaggregate data to examine the FDI distribution in China. For example, as the 
determinants of FDI from different source countries are expected to be different, 
disaggregate data would enable analysis of the distribution of FDI from each source 
economy. Similarly, as different industries put different degrees of importance on 
different regional determinants, disaggregate data by industry can reveal more accurate 
15 
 
information and inference.  This approach is also consistent with the recent trend in the 
Chinese FDI distribution literature, in which authors have used disaggregate data by 
source economies, by industry, and by entry mode. Unfortunately, due to the limited 
access to Chinese data, this research is restricted to aggregate data. Future research will 
hopefully permit broader analysis. 
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Chapter Two (First Dissertation Essay): Does FDI Agglomeration 
Pattern Change Over Time In China? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Industrial activities agglomerate through the mechanisms of knowledge spillovers, 
specialized labor, and specialized intermediate goods suppliers3. Recently the 
agglomeration of FDI has received increasing attention. Head and Ries (1996) have built 
a model for agglomeration of foreign manufacturing investment in China through the 
mechanism of specialized intermediate inputs suppliers, and they use city-level data to 
reveal that foreign firms prefer cities where other foreign firms are located. Kinoshita and 
Mody (2001) point out the importance of private information to investment in emerging 
economies. Foreign investors suffer from a condition of adverse asymmetry in 
information costs compared to domestic firms, according to Mariotti and Piscitello (1995), 
and one of the lowest information-cost areas is the area where more FDIs have been 
accumulated. The information spillovers or sharing among foreign investors can also lead 
to agglomeration of FDI. It is also worth mentioning that Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
suggested that the self-reinforcing aspect of FDI begins to operate only after a certain 
economic development threshold has been reached. 
In addition to the centripetal forces that attract more FDI to the concentrated 
locations, centrifugal forces will operate when a certain level of clustering is reached. 
Fujita et al. (1999) identified the main centrifugal forces resulting in the dispersion of 
                                                 
3 Please refer to Marshall (1920), Krugman (1991), Fujita et al. (1999) for more on agglomeration 
economies. 
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industrial activities in space, which are immobile factors and congestion diseconomies. 
Cheng and Kwan (2000) proposed the idea of an equilibrium stock of FDI that is 
determined by a region’s endowments.  
The empirical literature on FDI determinants or location choices of multinational 
enterprises has recognized the importance of the agglomeration effect of FDI and 
included it as a determinant. In much of the literature, strong agglomeration is found, i.e. 
centripetal forces are empirically proved. See, for examples, Wheeler and Mody (1992), 
Head et al. (1999), He (2002), Campos and Kinoshita (2003), Crozet et al. (2004), and 
Du et al. (2008). Most studies are at the regional level such as the states of the U.S., 
provinces of China, and regions of France. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) provide a 
notable exception in that they study 25 transition economies. As a sharp comparison, the 
only recent study that did not find evidence of agglomeration of foreign investors is 
Guimaraes and Figueiredo (2000), which studied the location of FDI in Portugal.  
As far as I am aware, the changing agglomeration effect of FDI has not been 
subject to any empirical analysis. This essay uses China as the object of study and shows 
how the centripetal and centrifugal forces associated with FDI clustering change over 
time. China presents itself as a good natural experiment during the past three decades. 
When China started to initiate the opening policy in 1979, FDI inflows into the country 
was virtually zero. As shown in Figure 1, FDI inflows increased very slowly during the 
1980s, yet it has surged since the early 1990s. As the economy grew and developed at an 
extraordinary rate, it also successfully attracted an important share of world FDI inflows. 
By the end of the 1990s, China had become the second largest recipient of world FDI. 
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Within only 30 years, China has experienced noticeably different stages of development 
and FDI attraction.  
Figure 1 FDI inflows into China 1985-2008 (in $100 million) 
 
This essay uses a panel data of 29 Chinese provinces from 1992 to 2008 and 
empirically examines the changing agglomeration effect of FDI. When the coefficient for 
FDI agglomeration is assumed constant over the observation period, similar result is 
found as past studies on China, i.e. there is a strong agglomeration effect of FDI. In other 
words, the cluster of foreign enterprises has a strong positive influence on a province’s 
FDI attractiveness. However, empirical results show that in the late 1990s, the centripetal 
forces are getting weaker and centrifugal forces are getting stronger. In recent years, the 
agglomeration effect of FDI has almost vanished.  
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. The next section provides details on 
the regional view of FDI inflows over time. Section 3 contains a discussion of the 
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variables, data, and model. I present the empirical results in the section 4. Section 5 
concludes the essay. 
2. Regional View of FDI inflows over Years 
 
Since China opened its economy to FDI in 1979, it experienced distinct stages of 
FDI attraction. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the data on realized FDI inflows in the 29 
Chinese provinces for different periods of the past three decades. During 1979-1992, the 
two provinces (Guangdong and Fujian)4 that were first opened obviously took the lead in 
attracting FDI. These two provinces are followed in rank by three other coastal provinces 
(Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Beijing, respectively). In this stage, good endowments (like 
infrastructure, industrial base, and quality labor) in large municipalities and opening 
policies/incentives appear to be decisive factors for FDI attraction. The other top ten 
provinces in receiving FDI during this time period are all coastal5 provinces. Overall, the 
Coastal Region received a dominating share of 91.6%. For all other time periods, the top 
FDI receivers are still coastal provinces. From 1979 up to 2002, the top four positions 
were constantly dominated by Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Shanghai. The initial 
opening timeline and FDI policies have had far-reaching effects. Head and Ries (1996) 
showed that the agglomeration effect greatly magnified the impact of China’s initial FDI 
policy.  
                                                 
4 In July 1979 and May 1980 the Central Party Committee (CPC) and State Council decided to establish 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province as Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). 
5 After reviewing the experience of the SEZs, in 1984 the CPC and State Council decided to further 
liberalize the 14 coastal port cities, and further expanded the already opened coastal regions in 1985. 
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From Table 2, it should also be noted that starting with the period 2003-2005, 
Guangdong has lost its leading position to Jiangsu. Also, Fujian dropped to sixth in rank, 
and Shanghai has dropped to seventh. Two northeastern coastal provinces have risen in 
receiving FDI. Shandong rose to third, and Liaoning rose to fifth. Another important 
observation is that some provinces adjacent to coastal China have become more attractive 
for FDI.  Jiangxi rose in rank from nineteenth to tenth, Hubei from fifteenth to eleventh, 
and Hunan from eighteenth to twelfth. These changes are also captured in Table 3. Over 
the years, the share of FDI inflows received by the Southeast Coast has continuously 
declined while the share received by the Northeast Coast has risen. Central China has 
continuously received an increasing share. The observations from Table 1 through Table 
3 seem to reveal that during recent years the centrifugal forces have pushed the FDI 
(relative share instead of absolute amount) away from the initially concentrated region 
(Southeastern China), and the nearby regions (Northeastern China and Central China) 
were the immediate beneficiaries. 
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Table 1 Realized FDI inflows by Province (US$ million in 1982 Prices) 
 1979-92 1993-95 1996-98 1999-2002 2003-2005 2006-2008 
  Beijing 1,599 2,875 4,121 6,242 5,834 8,752 
  Tianjin 529 2,507 5,560 9,148 4,927 9,320 
  Hebei 311 1,356 3,456 3,080 3,096 4,351 
  Shanxi 69 136 513 837 391 1,887 
  Inner Mongolia 21 249 181 410 1,430 3,637 
  Liaoning 873 3,330 4,814 8,776 9,918 14,991 
  Jilin 104 757 998 977 856 1,473 
  Heilongjiang 214 831 1,428 2,613 2,481 3,527 
  Shanghai 2,505 7,214 10,385 11,789 12,913 13,977 
  Jiangsu 1,743 9,450 13,851 22,902 27,813 35,892 
  Zhejiang 505 2,818 3,428 6,424 13,265 16,424 
  Anhui 80 908 960 1,053 1,081 4,353 
  Fujian 2,721 8,703 9,865 12,100 11,081 14,114 
  Jiangxi 129 621 983 1,535 4,062 5,309 
  Shandong 1,291 5,727 5,774 11,043 16,594 16,479 
  Henan 247 1,022 1,415 1,397 1,763 4,939 
  Hubei 291 1,449 1,933 3,373 3,886 4,718 
  Hunan 159 1,022 1,926 2,398 3,325 5,487 
  Guangdong 10,768 22,198 27,933 38,187 25,700 28,344 
  Guangxi 310 1,942 1,922 1,491 765 1,161 
  Hainan 901 2,446 1,752 1,433 1,280 1,750 
  Sichuan 336 2,568 1,811 2,381 2,267 5,626 
  Guizhou 38 134 100 100 152 206 
  Yunnan 44 213 298 349 325 809 
  Shaanxi 405 652 978 984 1,084 1,943 
  Gansu 5 170 134 173 65 151 
  Qinghai 4 24 66 188 456 454 
  Ningxia 4 42 24 79 110 82 
  Xinjiang 50 128 87 81 90 231 
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Table 2 Realized FDI inflows by Province 
 1979-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2002 2003-2005 2006-2008 
 share rank share rank share rank share rank share rank share ran
k 
Beijing 6.1 5 3.5 7 3.9 8 4.1 9 3.7 8 4.2 9 
Tianjin 2.0 9 3.1 10 5.2 6 6.0 6 3.1 9 4.4 8 
Hebei 1.2 13 1.7 14 3.2 9 2.0 11 2.0 13 2.1 16 
Shanxi 0.3 22 0.2 25 0.5 22 0.6 22 0.2 24 0.9 20 
Inner 
Mongolia 
0.1 26 0.3 22 0.2 24 0.3 23 0.9 17 1.7 17 
Liaoning 3.3 8 4.1 6 4.5 7 5.8 7 6.3 7 7.1 5 
Jilin 0.4 20 0.9 19 0.9 18 0.6 21 0.5 21 0.7 22 
Heilongjiang 0.8 17 1.0 18 1.3 16 1.7 12 1.6 14 1.7 18 
Shanghai 9.5 3 8.9 4 9.7 3 7.8 4 8.2 5 6.6 7 
Jiangsu 6.6 4 11.6 2 13.0 2 15.1 2 17.7 1 17.1 1 
Zhejiang 1.9 10 3.5 8 3.2 10 4.2 8 8.4 4 7.8 4 
Anhui 0.3 21 1.1 17 0.9 21 0.7 19 0.7 20 2.1 15 
Fujian 10.4 2 10.7 3 9.2 4 8.0 3 7.1 6 6.7 6 
Jiangxi 0.5 19 0.8 21 0.9 19 1.0 15 2.6 10 2.5 12 
Shandong 4.9 6 7.0 5 5.4 5 7.3 5 10.6 3 7.8 3 
Henan 0.9 16 1.3 16 1.3 17 0.9 18 1.1 16 2.3 13 
Hubei 1.1 15 1.8 13 1.8 11 2.2 10 2.5 11 2.2 14 
Hunan 0.6 18 1.3 15 1.8 12 1.6 13 2.1 12 2.6 11 
Guangdong 41.0 1 27.2 1 26.2 1 25.2 1 16.4 2 13.5 2 
Guangxi 1.2 14 2.4 12 1.8 13 1.0 16 0.5 22 0.6 23 
Hainan 3.4 7 3.0 11 1.6 15 0.9 17 0.8 18 0.8 21 
Sichuan 1.3 12 3.2 9 1.7 14 1.6 14 1.4 15 2.7 10 
Guizhou 0.1 25 0.2 26 0.1 26 0.1 27 0.1 26 0.1 27 
Yunnan 0.2 24 0.3 23 0.3 23 0.2 24 0.2 25 0.4 24 
Shaanxi 1.5 11 0.8 20 0.9 20 0.6 20 0.7 19 0.9 19 
Gansu 0.0 27 0.2 24 0.1 25 0.1 26 0.0 29 0.1 28 
Qinghai 0.0 28 0.0 29 0.1 28 0.1 25 0.3 23 0.2 25 
Ningxia 0.0 29 0.1 28 0.0 29 0.1 29 0.1 27 0.0 29 
Xinjiang 0.2 23 0.2 27 0.1 27 0.1 28 0.1 28 0.1 26 
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Table 3 Realized FDI inflows by Region 
 1979-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2002 2003-2005 2006-2008 
Northeast Coast6 17.5 19.4 22.2 25.3 25.7 25.6 
Southeast Coast7 69.5 61.8 61.4 60.3 57.8 51.7 
Hainan&Guangxi 4.6 5.4 3.4 1.9 1.3 1.4 
Central China8 5.0 8.6 9.7 9.6 12.3 16.8 
Western China9 3.4 4.8 3.3 2.9 2.9 4.5 
 
 
3. Data, Model, and Variables 
 
The dataset is a balanced panel consisting of 29 provinces10 of China from 1992 
to 2008. The data are collected from various issues of the Statistical Yearbook of China 
and the Provincial Statistical Yearbook. Statistical yearbooks report no FDI data for 
Xizang (Tibet), and thus Tibet is excluded from the analysis. For the sake of consistency, 
Sichuan and Chongqing11 are re-aggregated. The dependent variable is the annual 
realized amount of FDI flowing into a province converted12 into constant US dollars.  
As the FDI data in this study is not disaggregated by industry or source countries, 
the amount of inflow into a region is expected to be primarily determined by a number of 
host characteristics, and thus the model will be as follows:  
                                                 
6 Include Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, and Shandong. 
7 Include Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. 
8 Include Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, and Jiangxi. 
9 Include Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan,  Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. 
10 Including three centrally administered municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai) and autonomous 
regions. 
11 In the statistical yearbooks, Chongqing is treated as part of Sichuan province before 1997 and as a 
separate region since 1997. Even if Chongqing is currently a centrally administered municipality like 
Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, for the sake of consistency in this analysis, Chongqing is still treated as part 
of Sichuan Province. 
12 The deflator for FDI is the U.S. producer price index of industrial commodities published by Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S.A.  (base year 1982) 
24 
 
??? ? ????????????????? 
The model to be estimated is specified in log-linear form because according to 
Blonigen et al. (2007) a log linear form leads to well-behaved residuals given the 
skewness common to FDI data and allows for interactions of the underlying linear forms 
of the variables. There are several alternative estimation methods for pooled cross-section 
and time-series data. In this analysis, I choose fixed-effects estimation for the following 
considerations: (1) As we see from previous studies, new determinants are continuously 
identified and estimated as significant, so this type of study is prone to the variable 
omission problem. Region effects can control for the potential endogeneity problem 
arising from omission of variables, especially if the omitted variables vary little over time. 
(2) The explanatory variables are such macroeconomic variables as GDP, wage rate, and 
degree of reform that are highly possible to be correlated with the unobserved region 
effects (or omitted variables), which makes both pooled-OLS and random-effects 
estimations inappropriate. (3) This study covers almost all regions in China, which makes 
fixed-effects more appropriate than random-effects estimation. 
3.1. Agglomeration Effect of FDI 
 
An important factor affecting FDI location choice is the agglomeration of FDI. 
All studies on China that include this variable have unanimously confirmed the strong 
agglomeration effect (for example, He, 2002; Li and Park, 2006; Havrylchyk and Poncet, 
2007; and Du et al., 2008). The focus of this research is to empirically examine the 
change in this effect over years.  
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China had sealed itself off from the rest of the world for three decades. During the 
early years of China’s opening, the country was little known to the outside world. The 
information costs faced by foreign investors were extremely high. Much more uncertainty 
and risk were involved in investing in such a transitional and socialist economy. The 
existence of operational foreign enterprises, let alone successful ones, offered one of the 
few positive signals about the local area to potential foreign investors. Existing foreign 
firms have constantly confronted local authorities for more suitable infrastructures and 
institutions. As a developing country, China did not have enough resources to improve all 
of its provinces at the same pace. Pressures from foreign firms did greatly speed up local 
improvements. Head and Ries (1996) also painted a vivid picture of how new foreign 
firms could access good-quality intermediate input suppliers at much lower cost if they 
entered a FDI clustering area. In addition, information sharing among foreign investors, 
technology spillovers among foreign enterprises, and a larger pool of qualified labor13 
add to the attractiveness of an area with a large number of foreign enterprises. With these 
centripetal forces of FDI, therefore, China’s initial opening policies and its special 
treatments given to the Coastal Region (especially the Southeastern Coast) had not just 
given the region a one-time advantage, but also led the region into a virtuous cycle in 
attracting more subsequent FDI.  
From 1979 to 1991, the FDI inflows in China grew gradually. By the end of 1991, 
the total amount of realized FDI was $25.1 billion. For that period of time, no one had to 
worry about the congestion diseconomies. In the following year, nearly half of this 
                                                 
13 FDI increases local labor quality or the pool of skilled labor through on-the-job and/or overseas training. 
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amount was received. In 1993, $27.5 billion was received. The FDI inflows have surged 
since then. By the end of 2008, the total FDI inflows amounted to $852.6 billion. A 
predominating share of over 80% has been constantly utilized by Coastal China (refer to 
previous section). Centrifugal forces of FDI clustering could have started to work in 
recent years, considering the large amount of FDI inflows and the high concentration in 
the Coastal Region. In addition, labor migration restrictions led to insufficient 
agglomeration according to Au and Henderson (2006). We often see evidence of 
centrifugal forces from news of China. Many multinational enterprises located in 
Southeastern China are complaining about rising wages and some have relocated to 
inland areas.  
In this study, I use the number of foreign enterprises in a province as a proxy for 
agglomeration or clustering of FDI and allow its coefficient estimate to change over four 
time periods (1992-1997, 1998-2002, 2003-2005, and 2006-2008). In this way, I will 
examine the changing agglomeration effect of FDI.  
3.2. Control Variables 
 
Control variables are drawn from past studies, including market size (real 
provincial GDP), population, labor cost adjusted by productivity, road transportation 
infrastructure, agglomeration of industrial activity, and degree of internal economic 
reform. Higher real provincial GDP (or larger market) reflects purchasing power and 
should attract horizontal FDI, which is used in almost all past studies. But a large 
population can dilute the effect of market size. Hence, I follow Blonigen et al. (2007) and 
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control for population. Population is expected to have a negative impact on FDI 
attractiveness. Holding GDP constant, the larger the population, the less the purchasing 
power a region has. Higher labor costs mean higher production costs that deter FDI. Past 
studies have identified the need to control for productivity or labor quality when 
estimating the effect of the wage rate on FDI, so here I use a productivity adjusted wage 
rate to measure labor cost. Multinational enterprises’ activities necessarily involve 
transportation, and better transportation infrastructure attracts FDI. Agglomeration of 
industrial activity implies better upstream and downstream linkages and should attract 
FDI. Market mechanisms and established legal infrastructure are crucial to the operation 
of MNEs, thus MNEs are expected to favor regions with higher degree of reform. Even if 
nearly all previous studies include a policy variable, this study does not. The reason is 
that measures of this variable (even in its best form of a policy index) used in past studies 
have little or no year-to-year variation, especially after 2000. With the more recent 
dataset used in this study, a policy variable will be overwhelmed by fixed effects. With 
the inclusion of fixed-effects, the exclusion of a policy variable should not result in any 
serious omitted variable bias. The measures, data sources, and expected effects of these 
host variables are provided in Table 4. 
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Table 4 Description of Variables 
Variable name Variable description Data source Expected 
sign 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) 
Aggregate annual FDI inflows into 
each Chinese province in 1982 US 
dollars14 
Statistical Yearbook of 
China and Provincial 
Statistical Yearbooks 
Dependent 
variable 
Labor Cost (WAGE) Average provincial nominal wage rate 
of staff and workers divided by labor 
productivity (where labor productivity 
is the ratio of output and the number of 
workers) 
Statistical Yearbook of 
China 
- 
Market Size (RGDP) GDP of a province deflated by GDP 
deflator, 100 million yuan 
Statistical Yearbook of 
China 
+ 
Population (POP) The total number of persons in a 
province 
Statistical Yearbook of 
China 
- 
Road transportation 
infrastructure15 
(ROAD) 
Total length of paved road per unit 
land mass, km/10000km2 
Statistical Yearbook of 
China 
+ 
Agglomeration of 
industrial activity 
(AGGLY) 
Percentage of industrial output in total 
GDP 
Statistical Yearbook of 
China 
+ 
Degree of reform16 
(MARFA) 
The share of non-state-owned units in 
total investment in fixed assets. 
Statistical Yearbook of 
China 
+ 
Agglomeration of 
foreign enterprises 
(RFE) 
The total number of registered foreign 
enterprises at the end of the year 
Statistical Yearbook of 
China 
+ 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
I conduct the econometric estimation with a fixed-effects model, controlling for 
province- and time-specific effects. The results of the model are shown in Table 5. The 
                                                 
14 To convert FDI into constant dollars, I use as the deflator the U.S. producer price index of industrial 
commodities published by Bureau of Labor Statistics (based year 1982). 
15 I experiment with three alternative measures for transportation infrastructure with the final choice of the 
second: (1) the total lengths of roads per unit of land mass; (2) the total lengths of high grade paved roads 
per unit of land mass; and (3) the total lengths of railway per unit of land mass. 
16 Fan et al. (2000) points out the significant regional disparity concerning the progress of internal 
economic reform and the reform can be viewed from five major areas (size of the government; growth of 
the non-state sector and the reform of the state-owned enterprises; inter-regional trade barriers and price 
controls; factor-market development including factor mobility; legal frameworks). It is impossible to 
construct a comprehensive index to reflect the degree of reform for my sample years due to data 
unavailability, so this study follows the common practice like in Havrylchyk and Poncet (2007) and uses 
the share of non-state investment to measure the degree of reform. 
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table displays three different specifications. The first specification does not allow the 
coefficient of any variable to change over time. The second and third specifications allow 
changes in the coefficient for the clustering of foreign enterprises over four time periods. 
The third specification also allows changes in the coefficient of market size. Overall, the 
models performed well, as evidenced by the R2 and Adjusted R2. All variables have their 
expected sign. 
Specification 1 reports that the coefficient estimate for the number of foreign 
enterprises is positive and statistically significant. The agglomeration of foreign 
enterprises or FDI is an important determinant for FDI inflows over the entire 
observation period 1992-2008. Relating to the key focus of this study, Specification 2 and 
3 provide the relevant information. The three interaction terms of foreign enterprises 
clustering and time period are all negative and statistically significant, providing evidence 
that, since the late 1990s, the agglomeration effect of FDI has diminished. Additionally, 
the statistical significance and the absolute value of coefficient estimate of the interaction 
terms increases over the three time periods, signaling the continuously weakening 
centripetal forces and strengthening centrifugal forces over years.  
As the outside world knows more about China through trade, FDI, and tourism, 
the information cost of investing in China is reducing. As China’s domestic institutions 
and infrastructures have significantly and constantly improved, especially based on the 
commitment to move toward a market economy, the uncertainty and risk of investing is 
getting lower as well. Hence, the centripetal forces have become less strong. On the other 
hand, local governments are making great efforts to improve their local investment 
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environment, and thus many more areas have arisen as possible investment destinations. 
The centrifugal forces have become stronger, which disperse FDI away from the 
congested areas. Better transportation infrastructures from inland to coastal decreases 
foreign investors’ favoritism toward the east coast. The high-speed railroad, which 
permits existing rail to be enhanced for freight transport in near future, is an example of 
how better transport will cause FDI to spread away from the coastal areas.  
Another interesting observation is that when market size is controlled for by 
allowing varying coefficients over time in specification 3, the weakening agglomeration 
effect of FDI is more potent. Other things equal, a province with 1% more foreign 
enterprises attracted 0.448% more FDI during 1992-1997, 0.32% more FDI during 1998-
2002, 0.224% more FDI during 2003-2005, and only 0.068% more FDI during 2006-
2008. During recent years the agglomeration effect of FDI has almost vanished. In other 
words, the centripetal and centrifugal forces now almost exactly offset each other.    
Market size (using real provincial GDP as a proxy after controlling for population) 
has a positive and significant coefficient as reported in specifications 1 and 2. However, 
as China gradually opened its domestic market and transitioned from a poor country to 
the world’s second largest economy, the local market had a changing influence upon 
foreign investors’ location decision. As shown in specification 3, the local market is not a 
statistically significant determinant during 1992-1997. But the interaction terms are all 
positive and significant, with ever increasing value and significance over time, suggesting 
increasing importance of market size. During 2006-2008, we can see that other things 
being equal, a province with a 1% larger market tends to attract 1.366% more FDI.  
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Many foreign investors have come into China for its low labor costs and we might 
expect labor cost to be a determining factor. Yet the coefficient is not statistically 
significant, which is consistent with some of previous studies such as Head and Ries 
(1996) and He (2002). The argument Guimaraes and Figueiredo made for Portugal can be 
applied to the case of China too, i.e., labor cost may well be a determinant of the decision 
to locate in China as opposed to other countries, but it is not a statistically significant 
factor in the decision to pick a province.  
Transportation infrastructure is found to be insignificant in previous studies. In 
this study, road transportation shows significance in specification 1 and 2, but not 
significant in specification 3. A better measure of transportation in future studies could 
lead to consistent significance for this variable. Here, I use the density of paved roads as a 
proxy for the sake of data availability from 1992, even if expressway or highway density 
is a better measure. The degree of internal reform has a positive influence, but it has a 
varying significance over the three specifications. The poor measure, due to data 
unavailability, may be a reason for its variability. Agglomeration of industrial activity is a 
significant determinant, which is consistent with other agglomeration studies.  
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Table 5 Empirical Results 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Constant 21.885 (5.397)*** 18.951 (4.613)*** 29.037 (6.806)*** 
lnRFE 0.412 (4.090)*** 0.454 (4.384)*** 0.448 (4.362)*** 
DUM98-02*lnRFE   -0.067 (-1.782)* -0.128 (-1.821)* 
DUM03-05*lnRFE   -0.120 (-2.952)*** -0.224 (-3.422)*** 
DUN06-08*lnRFE   -0.142 (-3.293)*** -0.380 (-5.008)*** 
lnRGDP 0.855 (3.868)*** 1.024 (4.224)*** 0.471 (1.625) 
DUM98-02*lnRGDP    0.346 (1.869)* 
DUM03-05*lnRGDP    0.517 (2.665)*** 
DUN06-08*lnRGDP    0.895 (4.244)*** 
lnPOP -2.595 (-5.227)*** -2.375 (-4.907)*** -3.094 (-5.287)*** 
DUM98-02*lnPOP     -0.422 (-3.147)*** 
DUM03-05*lnPOP     -0.585 (-4.000)*** 
DUN06-08*lnPOP     -0.763 (-4.837)*** 
lnWAGE -0.338 (-1.531) -0.297 (-1.331) -0.148 (-0.654) 
lnROAD 0.123 (2.001)** 0.126 (1.912)* 0.101 (1.347) 
AGGLY 0.017 (2.559)*** 0.013 (1.864)* 0.019 (2.590)*** 
MARFA 0.009 (2.609)*** 0.006 (1.724)* 0.001 (0.317) 
Observations 493  493  493  
R2 0.943  0.945  0.947  
Adjusted R2 0.937  0.938  0.940  
Notes: t-stat in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides new evidence on the factors that influence the amount of FDI 
inflows into a Chinese province. The most important finding is the diminishing 
agglomeration effect of FDI in China. Coastal areas’ FDI clustering no longer exerts as 
strong a pull for subsequent FDI. Policy makers will find it easier than a decade ago to 
direct FDI away from the highly concentrated coastal areas to the inland.  
The significantly varying coefficients found for the clustering of foreign 
enterprises and market size in this study provide an important piece of advice for future 
33 
 
research on FDI in China. China develops at an astonishingly fast speed. In only two 
decades, the country evolved through several development stages. When pooling data 
together over a long period of time, researchers need to carefully design the empirical 
model to capture the fundamental development milestones in China. 
This study sheds some light on the general picture of FDI agglomeration in China. 
But, because data availability restricts the analysis to using aggregate data, further 
research is called for. Future studies with more disaggregated data by sector and by 
source country can provide more accurate and insightful information. 
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Chapter Three (Second Dissertation Essay): Third-Region Effects on 
Inbound FDI: Evidence from Chinese Provinces 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The last three decades have seen extraordinary growth in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in the world and an increasing role of Multi-National Enterprises 
(MNEs) in globalization. China, as the second largest recipient of world FDI, has 
identified FDI as one of the driving factors for its spectacular economic growth. Local 
governments and authorities actively compete against one another in attracting FDI. A 
large and growing number of studies have examined the FDI determinants in China. A 
short list of recent studies include: Head and Ries, 1996; Wei et al., 1999; Coughlin and 
Segev, 2000; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Tung and Cho, 2001; He, 2002; Fung et al., 2005; 
Gao, 2005; He, 2006; Li and Park, 2006; Havrylchyk and Poncet, 2007. However, none 
of the past studies has taken into account the interdependence of regions implied by the 
recent MNE theory17. 
The recent theoretical works on MNE have departed from the two-country 
framework18 and emphasized the importance of third countries. For example, Yeaple 
(2003) uses a three-country model to analyze why a MNE might follow a complex 
                                                 
17 Coughlin and Segev (2000) is the only study on China that uses spatial econometrics. But their spatial 
modeling is not based on the recent MNE theory; instead, it relies exclusively on spatial tests. As a result, 
only a spatial error is included in the spatial modeling. With cross-sectional data, they find a positive 
coefficient for the spatial error and also find that the inclusion of spatial error does not change their 
parameter estimates from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. 
18Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) initiated the development of formal MNE theory and relied on a 
two-country framework. Markusen (1984) developed a general equilibrium model and suggested a pure 
horizontal motivation of MNE that aims for host country’s market. Helpman (1984) developed a general 
equilibrium model and suggested a pure vertical motivation of MNE that aims for a host country’s cheaper 
productive factors. 
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integration strategy. He advises empirical research that complex integration strategies of 
MNEs create dependence between FDI into one country and the characteristics or 
policies of its neighbors. Dependence of this nature has important implications for the 
FDI structure across countries. Grossman et al (2006) use a three-country model to 
examine a rich array of complex integration strategies of a MNE that maintains its 
headquarters in the parent country and sets up its vertical chain of production in one or 
more locations. Ekholm et al. (2007) use a three-region model to analyze the Export-
Platform MNE whose output is sold in third countries. 
Blonigen et al. (2007) and Baltagi et al. (2007) were the first two empirical 
studies on FDI determinants to derive hypotheses on spatial linkages from the recent 
MNE theory. They use spatial models to provide empirical evidence for the theory. Both 
studies examine the US outbound FDI into host countries throughout the world. Their 
studies are followed by Garretsen and Peeters (2007), who examine the Dutch outbound 
FDI, Ledyaeva (2009), who examines the FDI in Russia, and Poelhekke and van der 
Ploeg (2009), who expand the set of common FDI determinants with urban 
agglomerations. 
Building on Blonigen et al. (2007), this essay fills the gap in the empirical 
literature on FDI determinants in China by incorporating the interdependence of regions. 
My major contribution includes extending the hypotheses and spatial modeling in 
Blonigen et al. (2007). I include more third country/region characteristics in the 
hypotheses and separate the spatial lag (that reveals the resulting FDI structure across 
regions) and third regions characteristics into two spatial models. Moreover, this is the 
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first study to provide information on how neighbor characteristics affect a particular 
region’s attractiveness to foreign investors. 
With a sample covering 29 regions (provinces) over the period 1993-2008, this 
study finds clear evidence of third-region effects. FDI across regions displays a negative 
spatial relationship, suggesting that most MNEs coming into China do not choose 
multiple nearby locations to perform their operation. Despite the competing pattern of 
FDI across regions, not all surrounding regions’ endowments have competing (negative) 
effects. Some regional endowments actually have complementary (positive) effects on 
other regions’ attractiveness for FDI. Putting together the third-region effects, this essay 
uncovers the motivations of FDI: Pure-Vertical and Export-Platform19forms of FDI 
dominate the aggregate FDI inflows into China. 
2. FDI in China 
 
Since China’s opening to the outside world in the late 1970s, FDI into China 
increased gradually during the 1980s and surged after the early 1990s. Figure 1 illustrates 
the pattern. As the second largest recipient of world FDI after the United States, China 
received $95 billion, 8.5% of the world total in 2009. 
                                                 
19 This paper studies the Chinese regions, so export-platform FDI here refers to the form of FDI that selects 
one Chinese region as the production platform to serve not only its own region but also other Chinese 
regions.  
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Figure 1 FDI inflows into China 1985-2008 (in $100 million) 
 
The FDI inflows has not been evenly distributed across regions (provinces) in 
China. Figure 2 shows the amount of FDI received by each region in 2008. Eastern 
regions have been receiving a predominating share (about 80%) over the years. The 
timing of regions open to FDI and preferential policies contributed to its pattern. Eastern 
China had been opened to foreign investment 10 years earlier than the rest of China, and 
it received many more preferential treatments.  Encouragingly, Central and Western 
China have shown a trend of increasing shares since the late 1990s.  China is 
geographically a large country, and its diverse regions offer many alternative location 
choices for MNEs. Each region has its own distinct endowments. Western and Central 
China are better endowed with natural resources, while Coastal or Eastern China is better 
endowed with qualified labor forces and transportation infrastructures. China’s shift from 
central planning to a market economy, along with its opening during the past three 
decades, has allowed its regions to explore their regional comparative advantages. During 
this process some regions have grown much faster than others. 
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Figure 2 FDI inflows into each Chinese region (province) in 2008 (in 
million US Dollars) 
 
China is potentially attractive to different forms of MNEs. With its fast growth, 
nearly 20% of the world’s population and noteworthy trade barriers with other countries, 
China may attract Horizontal MNEs that aim to sell in the Chinese markets to avoid the 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. As in the European Union, such MNEs are likely to 
choose one or few regions as a platform from which to serve the rest of China. China is 
also a developing country with abundant low-priced productive inputs, which are 
attractive features for Vertical FDI. This study also explores the question of whether the 
Vertical MNEs tend to choose one location or adopt the Complex-Vertical strategy to 
choose several locations. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
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The empirical hypotheses20 and spatial modeling in Blonigen et al. (2007) are 
employed by all three subsequent studies (Garretsen and Peeters, 2007; Ledyaeva, 2009; 
and Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2009). This essay builds on Blonigen et al. (2007). 
Pure-Horizontal FDI aims for the host’s internal market. It usually occurs when 
the host market is large and trade frictions are high, so that the saved trade costs exceed 
the additional plant set-up costs. When an MNE with this strategy evaluates a 
country/region, third countries/regions will have no effect at all, and thus no spatial 
linkages exist. As for the country/region’s own characteristics, its market size and trade 
frictions with the parent country should have strongly positive effects. 
Export-Platform FDI seeks market access, but it also seeks to export to other 
markets. If the saved trade costs exceed the plant set-up costs in one of the target markets, 
Export-Platform FDI can occur and will select one target market as a platform to produce 
and sell to the whole group of target markets. The location choice of one country/region 
at the expense of others implies a negative spatial relationship of FDI inflows across 
countries/regions. A negative spatial lag is thus expected in spatial estimation. In addition, 
surrounding markets’ potential should have a strongly positive effect21, while trade 
barriers of surrounding countries/regions should have a strongly negative effect. 
Furthermore, the country/region’s own market size and trade frictions with the parent 
country should be important and positive determinants, following the similar reasoning 
given above for Pure-Horizontal FDI. 
                                                 
20For more details, please see Blonigen et al. (2007) page 1307. 
21 Note that the surrounding market might not have a positive effect if the border costs among the countries 
or regions within the group are not about the same, see Blonigen et al. (2007) page 1319 for a detailed 
discussion.  
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Pure-Vertical FDI aims to exploit the host’s low-priced productive factors. Such a 
MNE keeps its headquarters in the parent country and sets up its production plant in the 
host with output shipped back to the parent country. This form of MNE evaluates 
country/region and selects the host that will provide them with output at the lowest cost. 
Hence, this form of FDI goes to a country/region at the expense of going into others, 
which implies a negative spatial relationship of FDI. However, it differs from Export-
Platform FDI with regard to the effects of country/region  and neighbor characteristics: (1) 
own market size or surrounding markets’ potential should not matter for Pure-Vertical 
FDI, as the output is shipped back to the parent country; (2) a host’s trade cost with the 
parent country should have a strongly negative impact, as trade cost adds to the total cost 
of providing the output to the parent country; (3) a host’s prices of productive factors 
such as wage rate should be strong determinants. Prices of productive factors in 
surrounding countries/regions should matter, because the closer the other regions with 
cheaper productive factors, the stronger the competition (substitute) effect. 
Complex-Vertical FDI also aims for low-priced productive factors. Instead of 
choosing one host location to produce, a Complex-Vertical MNE fragments its 
production into several productive activities that are carried out in different host locations, 
and thus it is capable of exploiting the various kinds of productive resources endowed in 
different locations. The cooperation among the hosts results in a positive relationship of 
FDI. In addition to the three implications for the effects of a country/region and neighbor 
characteristics mentioned above for the form of Pure-Vertical, Complex-Vertical FDI 
also needs low trade costs between the host and its surrounding countries / regions, as 
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intermediate goods are sent among affiliates. Different from Pure-Vertical form, the 
prices of productive factors in surrounding countries/regions should have a 
complementary effect, due to the hypothesized cooperation. 
Table 1 Empirical Hypotheses for Various Forms of MNE (FDI) 
 MNE Strategy/FDI Motivation22 
 Pure 
Horizontal 
Export 
Platform 
Pure 
Vertical 
Complex 
Vertical 
FDI in Surrounding Regions 0 - - + 
Surrounding Markets’ Potential 0 + 0 0 
Surrounding Regions’ High Productive Factor 
Price 
0 0 + - 
Trade Barriers with Surrounding Regions23 0 - 0 - 
Trade Frictions with Parent Country24 + 0 - - 
Own Market Size + 0 0 0 
Own Region’s Productive Factor Price 0 0 - - 
 
4. Empirical models and data 
4.1. Baseline model 
 
One of the concerns of this study is whether statistical inference or conclusions 
drawn on traditional FDI determinants are robust to the inclusion of spatial dependence25. 
                                                 
22 The strategy adopted by a MNE corresponds to the motivation of FDI. So in this paper, the two terms are 
used interchangeably.   
23 Due to data availability problem, this study assumes that trade barriers across provinces are at roughly 
the same level, and do not include this variable. If future study could obtain a good measure for this 
variable and include it in the analysis, it would be a good extension to this study. 
24 In this current study, I do not include trade frictions with parent country because I am analyzing the FDI 
inflowss into different regions within one country, the trade frictions with parent country are about the 
same across regions. 
25 According to Anselin (1988), ignoring the spatial dependence can give rise to econometrics problems of 
inconsistent or inefficient parameter estimates and invalid statistical inference.  So in this paper I’ll test for 
the presence of spatial dependence and use spatial models if the spatial dependence is actually present. 
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The analysis starts with a traditional fixed-effects26 model without any spatial 
dependence. The model is specified in log-linear form because, as mentioned in Blonigen 
et al. (2007), “such a model leads to well-behaved residuals given the skewness common 
to FDI data and allows for interactions of the underlying linear forms of the variables.” 
The baseline model is as follows: 
??? ? ?? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ??    (1) 
Host variables include market size (real provincial GDP), population, labor cost 
adjusted by productivity, road transportation infrastructure, agglomeration of industrial 
activity, agglomeration of foreign enterprises, and degree of internal economic reform. A 
time trend is also included to explain anything that affects all regions equally over time. 
Most of the host variables are similar to those used in previous studies on FDI 
determinants in China. Higher real provincial GDP (or larger market) reflects purchasing 
power and should attract Horizontal FDI, which is used in almost all past studies. But a 
large population can dilute the effect of market size. Hence, I follow Blonigen et al. 
(2007) and control for population. Population is expected to have a negative impact, 
because holding GDP constant, the larger the population, the less the purchasing power a 
region has. Higher labor cost means higher production cost and deters FDI. Past studies 
have identified the need to control for productivity or labor quality when estimating the 
                                                 
26 I choose to use fixed-effects estimation throughout this paper for my panel dataset for the following 
considerations: (1) As we see from previous studies, new determinants are continuously identified and 
estimated as significant, this type of study is prone to the variable omission problem. Region effects can 
control for the potential endogeneity problem arising from omission of variables, especially if the omitted 
variables vary little over time. (2) The explanatory variables are such macroeconomic variables as GDP, 
wage rate, degree of reform that are highly possible to be correlated with the unobserved region effects (or 
omitted variables), which makes both pooled-OLS and random-effects estimation inappropriate. (3) This 
study covers almost all regions in China, which makes fixed-effects more proper than random-effects 
estimation. 
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effect of wage rate on FDI, so here I use productivity adjusted wage rate to measure labor 
cost. MNE activity necessarily involves transportation, and better transportation 
infrastructure attracts FDI. Agglomeration of industrial activity implies better upstream 
and downstream linkages27 and should attract FDI. Market mechanisms and established 
legal infrastructure are crucial to the operation of MNEs, thus MNEs are expected to 
favor regions with higher degree of internal economic reform28. Agglomeration of foreign 
enterprises is used in few of previous studies. It can catch the self-reinforcing effect or 
agglomeration effect of FDI (i.e., higher level of existing FDI attracts subsequent FDI). 
This effect of FDI can be explained through lower information costs29 and positive 
externalities30 that FDI generates.  Even if nearly all previous studies include a policy 
variable, this study does not. The reason is that the measures of a policy variable (even in 
its best form of a policy index31) used in past studies have little or no variation over years 
especially after 2000. With the more recent dataset used in this study, a policy variable 
will be overwhelmed by fixed effects, and the exclusion of this variable should not 
impose any omitted variable bias. The measures, data source, and expected effects of 
these host variables are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. Note that productivity-
                                                 
27Please refer to New Economic Geography Theory (Krugman, 1991 a, b; Venables, 1993, 1995). 
28 Since 1979, China has carried out the internal economic reform, moving gradually from centrally 
planned to market economy. Some provinces have proceeded with the economic reform at a faster pace, 
having a high ratio of private businesses,  a better-developed legal infrastructure, and better market 
conditions, while other provinces still have prevalent government interference, few private enterprises exist, 
and the legal system is substantially under-developed (Li and Park 2006). 
29Mariotti and Piscitello (1995), points out that one of the lowest information-cost areas is the area where 
more FDI has been accumulated. He (2002) mentions that there are information spillovers or sharing 
among foreign investors. 
30 FDI generates positive externalities on technology, skilled labor, and intermediate goods suppliers. 
31 The measure for FDI policy or incentives used in most studies is a dummy variable with 1 for coastal 
regions and 0 for inland regions. A few recent studies construct policy index as the measure. For example, 
Demurger (2002) uses a preferential policy index that is constructed by giving to each province a weight 
that reflects the type of economic zone that it hosts; He (2006) constructs an index by totaling two sets of 
policy zones and assigning different weights to them. 
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adjusted wage rate and agglomeration of foreign enterprises are entered as one-period 
lags, to avoid the feedback effect from the dependent variable, thus avoiding an 
endogeneity problem. 
 
4.2. Spatial specifications 
 
I use two spatial models to examine the third-region effects. The first is a 
Spatially Auto-Regressive model with spatially Auto-Regressive errors (SARAR) to 
examine the resulting FDI structure across regions, as shown in equation (2). 
??? ? ?? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ?? ? ? ? ??? ? ?,   where   ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (2) 
W is the spatial weight matrix as discussed in the following sub-section 4.3. The 
variable ? ? ???????? is the spatially weighted average of all other regions except the 
region under consideration. For example, if the variable is FDI, ? ? ??? means the 
spatially weighted average of FDI flowing into other regions. A positive ρ means that a 
particular region’s FDI inflows increases (decreases) when surrounding regions’ FDI 
inflows increases (decreases). This is the case when MNEs choose several nearby 
locations to produce in accordance with Complex-Vertical FDI. A negative ρ means that 
a particular region’s FDI inflows decreases (increases) when surrounding regions’ FDI 
inflows increases (decreases), displaying an obvious competition pattern. This is the case 
when MNEs choose just one location at the expense of choosing surrounding regions. 
The spatial lag term ? ? ??? might not be able to catch all spatial dependence. 
The spatial error term can exist for several reasons such as common shocks or 
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transmission of shocks32, unobserved characteristics that are spatially related33, and 
measurement errors34. Spatial tests will serve as a supplemental tool in determining 
whether the spatial error term is still needed in the presence of the spatial lag. If a spatial 
error term is needed (γ ≠ 0,), equation (2) becomes a SARAR model; if a spatial error 
term is not needed (γ = 0), the model is reduced to a pure spatial lag model. 
Yeaple (2003) points out that the complete set of FDI determinants includes both 
country and neighborhood characteristics. To this end, I construct a Spatial Error Model 
(SEM) consisting of both own region characteristics and spatially weighted third regions 
characteristics, as follows: 
??? ? ?? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ?? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ?,                                       
where ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?        (3) 
4.3. Spatial weight matrix 
 
W is the spatial weight matrix. There is no specific theoretical guideline for 
constructing the weight matrix, and usually W is constructed based on how the regions 
are hypothesized to be spatially related. For a cross-sectional dataset, the weight matrix is 
a block-diagonal ? ? ? matrix, where N is the number of cross-sections, here denoted as 
Wt to relate to the weight matrix W used in the panel data setting. 
                                                 
32 In the case of China, the provinces under observation are within one country, they are faced with many 
common shocks, and even the shocks occurring in a particular region can be easily transmitted to other 
regions 
33 In this study of China, many regional characteristics cannot be quantitatively and accurately measured 
including China’s biased regional development policy, geographical location with its particular 
endowments like better infrastructure and industrial background, historical external contact with the world, 
etc, and these unobserved characteristics can be spatially related. 
34 Potential measurement errors associated with geographic data is another cause for spatial error. 
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?? ? ?
? ???
??? ?
? ???
? ???
? ?
??? ???
? ?
? ?
?      (4) 
A panel dataset is used in this study, so the full weight matrix W is the block-
diagonal ?? ? ?T matrix 
? ? ?? ???        (5) 
where T is the number of time periods, NT=N*T, lT is a ? ?T  identity matrix, and t 
denotes time period, it can be 1, 2, …, T. In our case, the weight matrix Wt is constructed 
based on geographical distance and does not vary over time, so it is the same across 
observation time periods. 
Following Blonigen et al. (2007) and Baltagi et al. (2007), the weight matrix is 
constructed using inverse distance function where the shortest bilateral distance (i.e. the 
131 km between Tianjin and Beijing) within the sample receives a weight of unity. 
Therefore, 
???????? ?
???
???
 ??????? ? ?      (6) 
where ??? is the distance between the capital cities
35 of province i and j. 
Following the common practice, the weight matrix is standardized so that each 
row sums to unity. 
4.4. Sample data 
 
                                                 
35 The distances between capital cities are the driving distance found from http://maps.google.com. 
49 
 
The full sample is a panel of annual data for the 29 provinces36 in China from 
1993 to 2008. I choose 1993 as the starting year for the sample data because that year was 
the first full year after China opened to foreign investment nationwide. 
For ease of comparison with past studies, the data for this study is taken almost 
exclusively from the Statistical Yearbooks of China published annually by the Statistical 
Bureau of China. Only some FDI data are obtained from the Provincial Statistical 
Yearbooks due to the discontinued availability of FDI data in the Statistical Yearbooks of 
China after 2003. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Six Model Specifications 
 
Table 2 summarizes the regression results for six model specifications. Columns 
(1) - (3) present pooled OLS, random-effects, and fixed-effects estimation for equation 
(1), respectively. Region effects are significant, and the adjusted R2 and log-likelihood 
clearly show preference of fixed-effects over the other two alternatives. These results 
suggest that fixed-effects estimation is most appropriate for the current study, and thus 
fixed-effects is used throughout the analysis. 
Spatial tests confirm the need for spatial modeling. Columns (4) and (5) present 
the estimations of equation (2) – the spatial lag model without the spatial error term (SAR) 
and with the spatial error term (SARAR). The spatial test result shows that a spatially 
auto-correlated error term is still needed when a spatial lag is already included, which 
                                                 
36 All the provinces, autonomous regions, and self-administered municipalities are included except Tibet. I 
combine the data from Chongqing and Sichuan Province because they have only existed as separate entities 
since 1996. 
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points out that SARAR model is more appropriate than SAR model for this dataset. The 
log-likelihoods show that the model fit increases as it moves from column (3) to column 
(5), which further suggests that spatial dependence exists and SARAR better takes care of 
the spatial dependence than SAR. The last specification estimates equation (3) – the 
spatial error model with spatially weighted exogenous variables, and results are presented 
in column (6). 
5.2. Results 
5.2.1. Own Region FDI Determinants 
 
The comparison of non-spatial estimation (column 3) and spatial estimations 
(columns 5 and 6) shows that the inclusion of spatial dependence does not change the 
effects of common determinants qualitatively except for the labor cost, but instead 
changes them quantitatively. The omission of spatial dependence tends to upwardly bias 
the coefficients of most determinants and change the significance level of variables. 
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Table 2 Estimation Results for Aggregate FDI inflows into Chinese 
Regions, 1993-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Explanatory Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
 Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
Own Region Characteristics       
Agglomeration of Foreign Enterprises 0.550*** 5.013 0.274*** 2.578 0.233* 1.765 
Productivity Adjusted Wage Rate -0.109 -0.918 0.014 0.061 0.205 0.748 
Road Transportation 0.072 0.483 0.309*** 3.068 0.209 1.332 
Agglomeration of Industrial Activity 0.178 0.463 0.839*** 3.213 1.068*** 5.430 
Degree of Reform 0.939*** 2.500 0.649** 2.443 0.695*** 2.700 
Real GDP 1.049*** 2.904 1.422*** 3.944 1.628*** 3.043 
Population -0.647*** -2.720 -0.958*** -3.078 -3.317*** -2.994 
Time Trend -0.064** -1.944 -0.093*** -3.038 -0.083* -1.852 
Log-likelihood -450.90    -235.77  
Adjusted R2 0.87  0.69  0.94  
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 2 Continued 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Explanatory Variables Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
 Fixed Effects in SAR Fixed Effects in 
SARAR 
Fixed effects in SEM 
 Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
Own Region Characteristics       
Agglomeration of Foreign 
Enterprises 
0.236*** 4.500 0.259*** 4.612 0.294*** 4.869 
Productivity Adjusted Wage 
Rate 
0.100 0.674 -0.280* -1.634 -0.282 -1.515 
Road Transportation 0.203** 2.424 0.092 1.207 0.147* 1.794 
Agglomeration of Industrial 
Activity 
0.940*** 4.161 0.043 0.170 0.288 1.058 
Degree of Reform 0.679*** 5.300 0.754*** 5.991 0.859*** 6.129 
Real GDP 1.518*** 6.178 1.321*** 5.425 1.064*** 4.012 
Population -3.190*** -5.272 -3.418*** -6.248 -3.372*** -5.729 
Time Trend -0.091*** -3.736 0.199*** 3.757 -0.191** -2.006 
Third Regions' 
Characteristics 
      
Agglomeration of Foreign 
Enterprises 
    -0.339*** -3.213 
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Productivity Adjusted Wage 
Rate 
    1.575*** 4.981 
Road Transportation     0.031 0.149 
Agglomeration of Industrial 
Activity 
    -1.281* -1.869 
Degree of Reform     -2.063*** -4.953 
Real GDP     3.345*** 3.391 
Population     -2.921 -0.911 
Spatially weighted FDI 
(spatial lag) 
0.144 1.344 -2.808*** -16.912   
Spatial error   0.918*** 57.398 -0.371** -2.170 
Log-likelihood -234.28  -221.09  -206.79  
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
After accounting for the spatial dependence through specification (5) or (6), the 
qualitative effects of the determinants of FDI are consistent with past studies. Real 
provincial GDP (after controlling for population), road transportation infrastructure, 
degree of internal reform, agglomeration of foreign enterprises, and agglomeration of 
industrial activities all have positive effects, while labor cost has a negative impact. We 
see that market size and degree of reform are the strongest determinants. With all the 
explanatory variables (except time trend) expressed in natural logarithms, the coefficient 
of 1.3 for real GDP implies that when real GDP itself increases by 1%, the province will 
attract 1.3% more FDI. When the degree of reform is increased by 1%, the province can 
receive 0.75% more FDI. Agglomeration of foreign enterprises and labor cost are two 
other significant variables. Agglomeration of industrial activities is not statistically 
significant. 
With more recent data, this study differs from past studies in that it finds some 
significance for road transportation (see column (6)). Conceptually, transportation 
infrastructure should be important to all forms of FDI, but all past studies on China find it 
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to be insignificant. This statistical insignificance may be due to the fact that the road 
transportation route density did not vary much across provinces before 2000, especially if 
we exclude five outliers shown by the 1993 pattern in Figure 3. A similar pattern for 
railroad is found. So it is not surprising that past studies found transportation to be 
statistically insignificant. The variation across provinces has increased in the past decade. 
The past several years have witnessed significant improvement in China’s transportation 
infrastructure, and widening regional differences, as shown by the 2008 pattern in Figure 
3. As we accumulate more years of data in the future, it will be interesting to see if the 
significance of transportation infrastructure increases further. This finding provides an 
important piece of advice for policy makers: they should not under-value transportation 
infrastructure even though most empirical studies on FDI determinants find it to be 
statistically insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Figure 3 Total length of paved road per land mass (km/10000km2), 
excluding five outliers (top two: Shanghai, Beijing; bottom three: Xinjiang, 
Qinghai, Inner Mongolia) 
 
5.2.2. Third-region Effects 
 
The spatial lag in column (5) reveals the structure of FDI across regions. This 
variable is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of -2.8 suggests that a 
particular region’s FDI inflows decrease by 2.8% when the spatially weighted average of 
FDI inflows in its surrounding regions increases by 1%. This competing pattern of FDI 
inflows across regions indicates that most MNEs coming into China do not choose 
multiple locations. However, despite this competing pattern of FDI, it is not necessarily 
true that all surrounding regions’ endowments display competing effects and draw away 
FDI. Column (6) reveals that larger market size and better transportation infrastructures 
in surrounding regions actually enhance a particular region’s attractiveness to foreign 
investors. Surrounding regions’ lower labor cost, higher degree of reform, agglomeration 
of industrial activities, and agglomeration of foreign enterprises draw away FDI inflows 
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from a particular region. All of the surrounding regions’ variables display significant 
effects, except transportation infrastructure. Both Columns (5) and (6) provide strong 
evidence of third-region effects. 
The variable of agglomeration of foreign enterprises deserves a little more 
attention. One can see from either column (5) or (6) that own region’s agglomeration of 
foreign enterprises has a positive and statistically significant effect, which indicates that 
there is a strong self-reinforcing or agglomeration effect of FDI. The surrounding regions’ 
agglomeration of foreign enterprises has a negative and statistically significant effect on a 
particular region, which suggest that the benefits or positive externalities of FDI 
agglomeration do not spill over to surrounding regions. 
5.2.3. Motivations of MNE (FDI) Coming into China 
 
Based on the empirical hypotheses in Table 1, the motivations of FDI can be 
uncovered from columns (5) and (6) of Table 2. The spatial lag is negative and strongly 
significant, which is consistent with Export-Platform and Pure-Vertical FDI. The 
additional finding of strongly significant and positive coefficients for own market size 
and surrounding markets’ potential is strongly suggestive of Export-Platform FDI. This 
finding also bears on the issue of border costs37 discussed in Blonigen et al. (2007). When 
the border costs with third countries/regions are low enough, surrounding markets’ 
potential has a significantly positive effect on the host receiving Export-Platform FDI. 
                                                 
37 They find negative effect of surrounding markets’ potential for their full sample of all countries or sub-
sample of all OECD countries that is inconsistent with their hypothesis. With the suggestion that border 
costs might be the reason (see detailed discussion on this in Blonigen et al., 2007, p. 1319), they use the 
sub-sample of European OECD countries where border costs are rather low, and find largely expected 
result. 
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The positive surrounding markets’ potential found in this study also suggests that even if 
there are implicit trade barriers across Chinese provinces, they are low compared to 
international barriers. 
In addition to Export-Platform FDI, columns (5) and (6) in Table 2 provides 
evidence for Pure-Vertical FDI. The significant and negative coefficient for own region’s 
labor cost as well as the strongly significant and positive coefficient for surrounding 
regions’ labor cost perfectly match Table 1’s sign expectation for Pure-Vertical FDI. This 
result is not surprising. China is a developing country with abundant low-priced labor and 
other productive factors, and obviously much FDI is part of foreign firms’ verticalization 
strategies. On the other hand, this study does not find any evidence of Complex-Vertical 
FDI in China. The spatial lag is not positive and the surrounding regions’ low labor cost 
exerts a strong competing effect instead of complementary effect. So, Complex-Vertical 
FDI in China appears to be negligible relative to Pure-Vertical FDI. 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper includes spatial interactions of regions in analyzing the FDI 
determinants in China and uses two spatial models to account for third-region effects. A 
panel dataset of 29 Chinese provinces from 1993 to 2008 is used. 
The comparison of the non-spatial and spatial estimations suggests that the 
inclusion of spatial dependence changes the statistical estimates of traditional FDI 
determinants quantitatively but not qualitatively. After exploring the reasons for the 
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insignificance of transportation infrastructure in earlier studies, this study warns policy 
makers not to under-value the actual importance of transportation infrastructure. 
Third-region effects are revealed in both spatial models. The negative spatial lag 
in SARAR model suggests a competing relationship of FDI inflows into a particular 
region and its surrounding regions. This indicates that most MNEs coming into China do 
not choose multiple locations. Although the regions are competing against each other to 
attract FDI, the spatial error model with all spatially weighted FDI determinants reveals 
that not all surrounding regions’ endowments draw away FDI. Instead, some of neighbors’ 
endowments such as their good transportation infrastructure and market potential can 
enhance a particular region’s attractiveness.  
Additionally, this essay also uncovers the motivations of MNEs coming into 
China. It finds clear evidence of Pure-Vertical and Export-Platform FDI dominating the 
aggregate FDI inflows in Chinese provinces. Finally, the significantly positive coefficient 
for surrounding markets’ potential in this study provides additional evidence for the 
border effects as discussed in Blonigen et al. (2007). 
Due to data accessibility problems, unfortunately, this study is unable to 
disaggregate FDI by source country or industry and has to restrict itself to the aggregate 
FDI inflows into each province. However, it does provide a general picture of third-
region effects and China’s inbound FDI motivations. Future studies should seek 
disaggregated data by industry and by source country to provide more detailed and 
specific analysis for each industry’s FDI and each source country’s FDI. In addition, with 
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longer time series available in the future it will be interesting to examine the changing 
relative importance of FDI determinants after China’s entry38 to the WTO. 
  
                                                 
38 In November 2001, in the Qatari capital of Doha, the 4th Ministerial Conference approved China’s entry 
to the WTO, signaling that China’s opening to the outside world entered a new phase. Since 2001, China’s 
opening has moved from limited into a full range of market opening, from a unilateral self opening to 
multilateral opening with all WTO members, and from the old pilot-based policy-oriented opening into one 
under a formal legal framework. 
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APPENDICE 
Table A1 Description of Variables 
Variable name Variable description Data source Expected 
sign 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) 
Aggregate annual FDI inflows into 
each Chinese province in US dollars 
Statistical Yearbook 
of China and 
Provincial Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Dependent 
variable 
Labor Cost 
(Productivity adjusted 
wage rate) 
Average provincial nominal39 wage 
rate of staff and workers divided by 
labor productivity  (where labor 
productivity40 is the ratio of industrial 
output and the number of industrial 
workers) 
Statistical Yearbook 
of China 
- 
Market Size (Real 
Provincial GDP) 
GDP of a province deflated by GDP 
deflator, 100 million yuan 
Statistical Yearbook 
of China 
+ 
Population The total number of persons in a 
province 
Statistical Yearbook 
of China 
- 
Road transportation 
infrastructure41 
Total length of paved road per unit land 
mass, km/10000km2 
Statistical Yearbook 
of China 
+ 
Agglomeration of 
industrial activity 
Percentage of industrial output in total 
GDP 
Statistical Yearbook 
of China 
+ 
Degree of reform 42 The share of non-state-owned units in 
total investment in fixed assets. 
Statistical Yearbook 
of China 
+ 
Agglomeration of 
foreign enterprises 
The total number of registered foreign 
enterprises at the end of the year 
Statistical Yearbook 
of China 
+ 
 
                                                 
39 Here I choose to use nominal wage rate due to the consideration that foreign investors are supposed to 
care the actual amount of money paid to the workers instead of the real purchasing power of the money 
meant to the workers. 
40 I attempt two measures for labor productivity with final choice of the former one: one is measured as the 
value of industrial output divided by the number of industrial workers, the other as the value of total 
provincial output divided by the total number of workers. The former one functions better than the other 
one probably because most of the FDI inflows into China concentrates in manufacturing sector. 
41 I experiment with three alternative measures for transportation infrastructure with the final choice of the 
second: (1) the total lengths of roads per unit of land mass; (2) the total lengths of high grade paved roads 
per unit of land mass; and (3) the total lengths of railway per unit of land mass. 
42 Fan et al. (2000) points out the significant regional disparity concerning the progress of internal 
economic reform and the reform can be viewed from five major areas (size of the government; growth of 
the non-state sector and the reform of the state-owned enterprises; inter-regional trade barriers and price 
controls; factor-market development including factor mobility; legal frameworks). It is impossible to 
construct a comprehensive index to reflect the degree of reform for my sample years due to data 
unavailability, so this study follows the common practice like in Havrylchyk and Poncet (2007) and uses 
the share of non-state investment to measure the degree of reform. 
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Table A2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Maximum Minimum Standard  Deviation 
FDI 11.15 14.74 6.32 1.78 
Agglomeration of Foreign Enterprises 8.06 11.11 2.20 1.44 
Productivity Adjusted Wage Rate 6.86 7.76 5.86 0.37 
Road Transportation 7.78 10.65 5.01 1.00 
Agglomeration of Industrial Activity 3.62 4.08 2.45 0.26 
Degree of Reform 3.87 4.46 2.49 0.37 
Real GDP 8.02 10.31 5.15 1.02 
Population 8.10 9.38 6.15 0.81 
 
Notes: (1) All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. The number of observations is 464. 
This is based on a balance panel with N=29 provinces and T=16 time periods. 
(2) The descriptive statistics of the variables are based on the data from 1993 to 2008. As one-
period lag is applied on productivity adjusted labor cost and agglomeration of foreign enterprises, the 
descriptive statistics of these two variables are based on the data from 1992 to 2007. 
 
Table A3  Diagnostic Tests 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 22.76347 -28,427 0.000 
Cross-section Chi-square 423.7995 28 0.000 
Spatial Tests 
Joint LR test in a fixed effects panel data model 
LR value 27.959 
Marginal Probability 0.000 
Chi2_2 1% value 9.210 
LR test for a SAR when spatially autocorrelated errors are already accounted for 
LR value 27.958 
Marginal Probability 0.000 
Chi2_1 1% value 6.635 
LR test for spatially autocorrelated errors when a SAR is already accounted for 
LR value 26.381 
Marginal Probability 0.000 
Chi2_1 1% value 6.635 
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Chapter Four (Third Dissertation Essay): Is Simultaneity a Concern to 
this Research? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Quite a few empirical studies on the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in China mention the possible simultaneity between the dependent variable FDI 
and explanatory variables (such as GDP and the wage rate). To avoid the endogeneity 
problem, some studies lag independent variables by one year to make the regressors 
predetermined, as for example Fung et al. (2005). Some use instrumental variables, as for 
example Havrylchyk and Poncet (2007). Most studies have not taken simultaneity into 
consideration. The question to be addressed in this essay is whether simultaneity plagues 
the econometric estimations in studies of the determinants of FDI.  
There are reasons for being concerned about the simultaneity issue. FDI may 
influence GDP or the wage rate. Theoretical analysis points out that FDI increases a host 
region’s investment level, and more importantly in developing countries FDI is an 
important source of human capital augmentation, technological change and spillovers of 
ideas, which results in improved economic performance of the host region. For China 
several studies have found a positive influence of FDI on economic growth, for example 
Berthelemy and Demurger (2000), Liu et al. (2002), Shan (2002), and Yao (2006).  
Foreign direct investment influences the local wage rate directly by creating a 
demand for labor and by offering a more competitive salary than domestic firms. 
Moreover, as foreign enterprises generate positive externalities on labor productivity 
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through on-the-job and/or overseas training, we expect that FDI will raise the marginal 
product of labor and hence the average wage rate in its host region. Ge (2006) uses a 
panel dataset of Chinese cities to examine the impact of FDI on the urban real wage, and 
the results show that FDI has a significantly positive effect on the urban real wage. Owen 
and Yu (2008) use a panel of 29 provinces over the years 1995-2001 and find that the 
effect of FDI on the wage rate varies by province.  
This study employs a simultaneous equation system and empirically reveals the 
inter-relationships among the three variables (real GDP, wage rate, and FDI). Using a 
panel dataset of 29 Chinese provinces from 1996 to 2008, this study finds that FDI has an 
effect on real GDP and the wage rate only after certain time delay, and thus simultaneity 
should not be a concern for analyzing FDI determinants in a single equation. As found 
out in this study, internal economic reform has a large positive impact on a province’s 
real GDP and thus should be an important factor explaining China’s fast growth. Many 
growth studies like the ones cited previously failed to take into account the economic 
reform. Failure to include this important factor might exaggerate the positive effect of 
FDI on the local economy. 
2. Constructing a Simultaneous Equations Model 
 
A simultaneous equation model is able to catch the bi-directional effects and 
uncover many interesting relationships among the endogenous variables. From the 
system of equations, more information can be revealed for the inter-related variables.  
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2.1. Obtain the GDP Equation 
 
Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for the economy: 
 

1LAKY           (1) 
where Y is GDP, A is a constant which measures total factor productivity, K is capital 
stock43, and L is labor. Take natural logs of both sides of equation (1) yields: 
LKAY ln)1(lnlnln          (2) 
Human capital is an important factor in production and is added to equation (2) to 
provide:  
LHKKAY lnlnlnlnln 321         (3) 
Where HK stands for human capital and ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? 
Total factor productivity is determined by technical efficiency and technological 
progress, here I roughly measure total factor productivity by a variable representing 
technological progress, i.e. the number of patent applications granted in each province, 
denoted as PAT. Human capital is measured by the labor quality of the population, i.e. 
the educational attainment of the population, denoted as EDUC. As mentioned before, 
FDI directly and indirectly can influence GDP, so we add FDI in the GDP equation.  
China opened its border and started the internal economic reform at about the 
same time. Literature on economic growth focuses a lot on the positive influence of 
China’s opening including FDI and exports on its economic growth, while ignoring the 
                                                 
43 Throughout this research, investment in fixed assets is used to represent the amount of capital wherever 
capital appears, as it’s hard to obtain the measure for the amount of capital and by common practice capital 
is obtained from investment flows. 
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other important factor that might have been playing an important role over the past three 
decades in China’s growth. The internal reform has been gradually transforming China 
from a centrally planned to a market economy. The economic system’s transformation 
surely raised growth to some extent. So here the ownership structure measure of the 
internal reform (denoted as MARFA) is included in GDP equation.  
So I rewrite the equation (3) augmented by the above-mentioned factors. Note 
that FDI is entered into equation in both current and lagged values, because there might 
be time lags of the effects on GDP from FDI. 
ititititit
ititititit
ucFDIFDIFDI
MARFAEDUCLKPATRGDP





28176
543210
lnlnln
lnlnlnln
  (4) 
2.2. Obtain the Wage Equation 
 
Labor quality is a necessary factor to determine the wage rate by common 
practice. The capital-labor ratio is in the wage equation, as suggested by neoclassical 
theory, the marginal product of labor is higher when the capital labor ratio is higher, so 
the capital-labor ratio should positively influence the wage rate. Because the average 
wage rate is for a given province, the equation needs other variables that help explain the 
inequality of wage rates across provinces and not just more individual characteristics like 
years of working experience. The available choices are industry structure and variables 
related to FDI. Average wage rates vary across industries. For example, in 2006 the 
average wage rate in agriculture was as low as 9,430 yuan while the wage rate in 
financial service industry was 39,280 yuan. Here I use the ratio of number of workers and 
staff in low paying industries to the number of workers and staff in high paying industries 
67 
 
as a measure for industry structure. As mentioned before, FDI might influence the wage 
rate in a host region. The effect can be immediate, or it can take time to have an effect, so 
the current and lagged values of FDI are entered in the equation. 
itititit
ititititit
ucEDUCIS
LKFDIFDIFDIWAGE





lnln
/lnlnlnln
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The FDI equation is borrowed from previous two essays. 
ittiititit
ititititit
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 (6) 
Equations (4) - (6) comprise the simultaneous equation system for this study. 
Variables definitions and data sources are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1 Description of Variables 
Variable 
abbreviation 
Variable name Variable description Data 
source 
FDI Foreign direct 
investment 
Aggregate annual FDI inflows into each Chinese 
province in 1982 US dollars 
Statistical 
yearbook 
and 
provincial 
yearbooks 
RFE Cluster of foreign 
enterprises 
# of registered foreign-funded enterprises at the 
end of year 
Statistical 
yearbook 
WAGE Labor Cost Average Wage of Staff and Workers divided by 
labor productivity (where labor productivity is the 
ratio of industrial output and the number of 
industrial workers) 
Statistical 
yearbook 
RGDP Market size GDP of a province deflated by GDP deflator, 100 
million yuan 
Statistical 
yearbook 
K/L Capital labor ratio Ratio of fixed assets investment to number of 
workers and staff 
Statistical 
yearbook 
EDUC Labor quality The percentage of population with college or 
higher degrees 
Statistical 
yearbook 
RD Road transportation Total length of high-grade paved road 
km/10000km2 
Statistical 
yearbook 
AGGLY agglomeration Percentage of industrial output in total GDP Statistical 
yearbook 
IS Industry structure Ratio of # workers in first industry and retails and 
wholesale to the # workers in finance and 
scientific research 
Statistical 
yearbook 
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MARFA Degree of reform in 
ownership structure 
The share of non-state-owned units in total 
investment in fixed assets. 
Statistical 
yearbook 
PAT Technological 
progress 
the number of patents applications granted in 
each province 
Statistical 
yearbook 
K Capital  Total investment in fixed-assets Statistical 
yearbook 
L Labor Total number of staff and workers Statistical 
yearbook 
 
3. Econometric Estimation and Results 
 
I use panel data from 1996-2006 for 29 provinces in China. Tibet is excluded 
because no FDI has ever been received over years. Chongqing is combined with Sichuan. 
As discussed in the previous two essays, fixed-effects estimation is the most appropriate 
for this dataset. The Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) will reveal more information 
than a single equation model. Iterated three-stage-least-square estimation is applied to the 
equation system.  
Results from simultaneous equation system are presented in Table 2. The FDI 
equation in the SEM provides slightly different results from the single equation 
estimation. The coefficient of the wage rate is positive and significant, which is 
unexpected. Some past studies find the wage rate to be positive when labor quality or 
labor productivity is not controlled for. But here the labor cost is adjusted by labor 
productivity. All other explanatory variables have the expected coefficient signs, but 
market size and degree of internal economic reform are not as statistically significant as 
expected.  
In the GDP equation, nearly all variables have the expected signs, except the 
current FDI inflows. The coefficients of capital, labor, human capital, and internal 
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economic reform are positive and significant. Quite a few growth studies on China do not 
consider internal economic reform (see as examples Berthelemy and Demurger, 2000; 
Yao, 2006). The result here reminds researchers of the importance of internal economic 
reform for China’s growth over the past three decades. Surprisingly, the current FDI 
inflows show an insignificantly negative correlation with GDP. The lagged values of FDI 
are positive, but also insignificant. But the p-values keep getting larger towards higher-
order lagged FDI, which might suggest that there exists a time delay for FDI to have 
effect on GDP.  
In the WAGE equation, labor quality, capital-labor ratio, and industry structure 
positively influence the average wage rate. Among the positive determinants for the wage 
rate, the labor quality and the capital-labor ratio are the most important factors. The 
effects of FDI inflows on wage rate depend on the lag. The current inflow may have a 
negative impact on the local wage rate, but it is not significant. After one year, the FDI 
starts to drive up the local wage rate, and this effect is statistically significant. After 
another year, the effect gradually goes down and becomes insignificant again.   
Table 2 Results from Simultaneous Equation System 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
FDI Equation (lnRFDI as dependent variable) 
lnRFE 0.446 (0.106)*** 
lnRGDP 0.748 (0.622) 
lnPOP -1.084 (0.838) 
lnWAGE 3.411 (0.880)*** 
lnRD 0.072 (0.108) 
MARFA 0.001 (0.005) 
AGGLY 0.025 (0.007)*** 
Constant -0.830 (0.179)*** 
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Observations 319  
R2 0.491  
GDP Equation (lnRGDP as dependent variable) 
MARFA 0.004 (0.001)*** 
lnPAT 0.006 (0.017) 
EDUC 0.016 (0.003)*** 
lnL 0.323 (0.046)*** 
lnK 0.210 (0.047)*** 
lnFDI -0.027 (0.078) 
lnFDILAG1 0.033 (0.056) 
lnFDILAG2 0.010 (0.015) 
Constant 0.103 (0.012)*** 
Observations 319  
R2 0.973  
WAGE Equation (lnWAGE as dependent variable) 
EDUC 0.012 (0.003)*** 
IS 0.046 (0.042) 
lnK/L 0.190 (0.039)*** 
lnFDI -0.103 (0.075) 
lnFDILAG1 0.102 (0.055)* 
lnFDILAG2 -0.024 (0.016) 
Constant 0.015 (0.004)*** 
Observations 319  
R2 0.979  
Endogenous variables:  lnRFDI lnRGDP lnWAGE  
Exogenous variables:   lnRFE lnPOP lnRD MARFA AGGLY dum97 dum98 dum99 
Dum00 dum01 dum02 dum03 dum04 dum05 dum06 dum07 dum08 lnPAT EDUC 
lnL lnK lnRFDILAG1 lnRFDILAG2 IS  lnK/L 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Past studies have expressed concerns regarding the feedback of FDI on GDP and 
the wage rate. This essay constructs a simultaneous equations model to further explore 
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the issue. The system does not provide good model fit for estimating FDI determinants, 
however, it reveals some important determinants for the wage rate and GDP. Above all, 
the system relieves our worry about the simultaneity problem, since FDI has delayed 
effects on both GDP and the wage rate. Additionally, this study also provides instruments 
for GDP and the wage rate if some researchers prefer the IV approach to check for 
estimation robustness.  
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